It stands to reason that social unrest does not erupt out of the blue. Although there are a great many reasons why social dismay might descend into social disorder, only few yardsticks or indices can plausibly be used to gauge the potential for social unrest (PSU). If policy makers want to undertake public action to prevent social dismay escalating into social disruption, they obviously need to draw on practical sensors. This paper assesses critically the adequacy of two such measures, the polarization (P ) index, and the total relative deprivation (TRD) index. The paper proposes a tentative guide to selecting between these two measures. A review of three stylized scenarios suggests that, where income redistributions reduce the number of distinct income groups, and when each group is characterized by a strong sense of within-group identity, the P index surpasses the TRD index as a basis for predicting PSU. When the within-group identification is weak, however, it is better to use the TRD index to predict PSU.
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Introduction
Even highly developed economies can face the prospect of social unrest. Think of the December 2008 events in Greece, or recall the riots that erupted in November 2005 and November 2007 in the poor neighborhoods of Paris. Usually, social turbulence does not appear out of the blue. It goes without saying that any responsible government will seek to identify the potential for social unrest (PSU) as early as possible, allowing it to take steps to nip it in the bud. What indicator could inform a government that social unrest is brewing? It is quite natural to expect that an early-warning measure could draw on, or incorporate, income inequality. 1 An intriguing body of empirical research seeks to find out what foments ethnic strife, violent conflicts, civil wars, and terrorism. The obvious objective of this body of work is enable governments to address the origins of social unrest and civil strife. If, for example, as Basuchoudhary and Shughart (forthcoming) find, economic freedoms and property rights significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorism will emerge, governments will want to promote economic liberties and market-friendly institutions. Clearly, tensions and potentials need to be measured. Our present inquiry thus complements the said empirical research in that we study ways to measure PSU rather than explore its root causes. Measuring tensions is a helpful tool in a drive to reduce tensions.
Following Runciman (1966), a measure of an individual's social dismay was developed by Yitzhaki (1979) , and subsequently axiomatized by Bossert and D'Ambrosio (2006) . In line with a rich sociology literature, the measure was termed "relative deprivation," and was shown to be equal to the fraction of people earning more than the individual times their mean excess income. The sum of the relative deprivation of all the individuals in a population yields the population's "total relative deprivation" (TRD). This index can serve as a proxy for the "aggregated degree of discontent" of a population and could thus be used to measure PSU, since for any individual, an increase in the income of any higher income earner results in greater relative deprivation (even when the individual's rank in the hierarchy of incomes remains unchanged), and for any individual (except the richest), a decline in the number of earners of lower incomes results in more relative deprivation (even when the number of higher income earners and their incomes remain unchanged).
A second possible indicator that could be used to measure PSU is the "polarization" (P ) index (Esteban and Ray 1994; Duclos et al. 2004) . Designed as a means of identifying the likely emergence of the tension between heterogeneous groups, polarization is taken to arise from the simultaneous sensing of within-group identity (or intra-group homogeneity), and between-group alienation (or inter-group heterogeneity): an individual's degree of withingroup identification increases with the number of individuals who share the same "fate," when fate is measured in terms of income. The intensity of the within-group identification then depends on the number of individuals who share the same level of income. The feeling
